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Abstract—Emerging smart home platforms, which interface
with a variety of physical devices and support third-party
application development, currently use permission models in-
spired by smartphone operating systems—the permission to
access operations are separated by the device which performs
them instead of their functionality. Unfortunately, this leads to
two issues: (1) apps that do not require access to all of the
granted device operations have overprivileged access to them,
(2) apps might pose a higher risk to users than needed because
physical device operations are fundamentally risk-asymmetric—
“door.unlock” provides access to burglars, and “door.lock” can
potentially lead to getting locked out. Overprivileged apps with
access to mixed-risk operations only increase the potential for
damage. We present Tyche, a secure development methodology
that leverages the risk-asymmetry in physical device operations
to limit the risk that apps pose to smart home users, without
increasing the user’s decision overhead. Tyche introduces the
notion of risk-based permissions for IoT systems. When using
risk-based permissions, device operations are grouped into units
of similar risk, and users grant apps access to devices at that
risk-based granularity. Starting from a set of permissions derived
from the popular Samsung SmartThings platform, we conduct
a user study involving domain-experts and Mechanical Turk
users to compute a relative ranking of risks associated with
device operations. We find that user assessment of risk closely
matches that of domain experts. Using this insight, we define
risk-based groupings of device operations, and apply it to existing
SmartThings apps. We show that existing apps can reduce access
to high-risk operations by 60% while remaining operable.
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart home platforms play the role of connecting hetero-
geneous devices and protocols while supporting third-party
application development. Several such platforms are emerging,
including Samsung SmartThings [2], Apple HomeKit [4], and
Google Home [1]. These platforms enable the promised home
IoT benefits of better convenience, improved security, and
more energy efficiency. However, such platforms pose security
threats—Fernandes et al. performed an empirical evaluation
of Samsung SmartThings, and discovered that its permission
model automatically overprivileges apps [9]. For instance,
an app that locks doors after 9PM also gains the ability to
unlock those doors at any time. Although overprivilege has
traditionally plagued several types of computing models, in
the context of IoT, it can cause physical and material harm,
beyond the classically prevalent digital harm.
In this paper, using the popular and widely-used Samsung
SmartThings as an example of a prototypical smart home
platform, we explore the design space of permission models
for smart homes with the goal of reducing the risk posed
to users if their smart home apps are compromised or are
malicious. In SmartThings, overprivilege occurs because its
permission model groups device operations based on func-
tional similarity—“door.lock” and “door.unlock” both control
the state of the lock. Functional grouping of operations helps
reduce the cognitive burden on developers, when requesting
permissions, and on users, when making security decisions
during application installation. A very fine-grained model,
where apps request permission for each device operation, only
increases the burden on developers and users and has been
shown to be impractical even in the smartphone environ-
ment [8]. The increased number of decisions a user has to
make in a smart home environment makes this approach even
less feasible. Therefore, despite the usability advantages of
a functionally grouped permission model, attackers can use
compromised or malicious apps, which are overprivileged, to
cause security and privacy risks.
We consider a middle ground between very fine-grained per-
device-operation permissions and functionally grouped per-
missions. Our insight is based on the fundamental risk asym-
metry of device operations—a property unique to physical
devices. As an example, “oven.on” is a potential fire hazard,
“oven.off” is potentially uncooked food, “mic.on” is a pri-
vacy risk, “mic.off” might only disable certain voice-assistant
functionality like Amazon Alexa, “door.unlock” is a potential
burglary risk, “door.lock” only locks the occupant outside (or
inside) and is a potential annoyance. We present Tyche, a
secure development methodology that leverages this intuitive
risk asymmetry, and groups physical device operations into
equivalence classes of risk. In this risk-based model, apps
specify access to device operations in terms of user-perceived
risk-levels. Our goal is to retain the usability advantages of
operation grouping while limiting the risks of overprivilege.
Tyche breaks down device functionalities into 3 risk cate-
gories (high, medium, and low). For our door lock example,
“door.unlock” will be in a high-risk group, and “door.lock”
will be in a medium-risk group for the door’s operations.
Developers request permissions by specifying the type of
the device, and the risk category. So, an application that
automatically locks the door after a specific hour will request
for the permission “door.medRisk” and this gives it access
to “door.lock.” If the application requests “door.highRisk,”
it will gain access to “door.lock” and “door.unlock.” That
is, there is an ordering relation between the risk categories.
Intuitively, if the user is willing to give an application high-
risk access to a device, the user is not concerned about low-
risk access. The risk-based model is an improvement over
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functional grouping because it still groups operations, but in
terms of risk. At the same time, Tyche does not prohibitively
increase the number of decisions user has to make, but ties an
intuitive risk factor to them. Therefore, it bounds the damage
that a compromised application can cause, and accurately
communicates that potential to users at installation time.
In designing Tyche, we overcame several challenges: (1)
We need a methodology to estimate the user-perceived risk of
device operations. To that end, we introduce a survey instru-
ment inspired by the methodology of Felt et al. that is designed
to compute a relative ranking of user-perceived risk[8]. The
survey captures concrete risks that can arise from a variety
of smart home devices, and then presents those risks to users.
We use this methodology to obtain a ranking of user-perceived
risk for Samsung SmartThings device operations. We focused
on this platform because of its wide support for smart home
devices (more than a 100). Furthermore, independently of the
specific framework, physical device operations tend to remain
the same. Therefore, our risk results are potentially applicable
to other smart home platforms as well. (2) We need a technique
to form equivalence classes of risk using the survey data. To
that end, we utilize a clustering-based approach, and found it
to work reasonably well in practice.
Contributions.
• We propose Tyche, the first risk-based permission model
for smart home platforms that leverages our insight
that physical device operations are fundamentally risk-
asymmetric.
• We compute the user-perceived risk of device operations
in the Samsung SmartThings platform using a user study
of three domain experts and 400 Mechanical Turk par-
ticipants. This dataset is available at https://github.com/
Ethos-lab/datasets.
• We empirically demonstrate that user-perceived risk of
device operations closely matches that of the experts, mo-
tivating future research on permission prompt UI designs
that focus on incorporating risk indicators.
• Through a case study of three existing smart home apps,
which we port to our risk-based permission model, we
establish that the number of risky operations an attacker
can issue reduces by 60%.
We envision that Tyche, including its user research method-
ology and permission model design, will serve as a set
of guiding principles for developers of future smart home
platforms.
II. BACKGROUND
A. SmartThings Framework
Figure 1 shows an overview of the SmartThings framework.
It consists of: (1) a physical hub that users place in their home,
(2) a proprietary cloud back-end that runs third-party applica-
tions, and (3) a companion application that runs on a user’s
smartphone that is used for local control and configuration.
This smartphone app serves as a display device for the hub,
as the hub itself has no display. Each hub supports a variety of
home automation protocols such as ZWave and ZigBee. The
companion application lets users download and install third-
party SmartThings apps (or SmartApps) into their SmartThings
cloud account. The SmartApps, written in the Groovy pro-
gramming language,1 interact with physical devices by issuing
method calls (e.g., lock a door) and by listening to events
from the devices (e.g., motion was detected). SmartApps
are published to an application store. Physical devices are
represented by device handlers or SmartDevices—pieces of
code that use protocol-level instructions to communicate with
devices. A device handler wraps a physical device, and exposes
it to the rest of SmartThings. Although the platform provides
device handlers for a wide variety of devices like door locks
and speakers, developers can also write their own device
handlers for unsupported devices.
SmartThings Permission Model. SmartApps must request
capabilities (permissions)2 for devices before they can interact
with them. A capability is composed of a set of commands
(method calls) and attributes (properties). Commands repre-
sent ways in which a device can be controlled or actuated.
Attributes represent the state information of a device. For
example, capability.lock contains the attribute “lock,” which
represents the current state of the lock, and the commands:
lock(), and unlock(), that an application can use to control the
door lock. When a user installs a SmartApp, SmartThings trig-
gers the device enumeration process where it lists all physical
devices that support the requested capabilities. For instance,
if a user’s home has two motion sensors, and a SmartApp is
requesting “capability.motionSensor,” then SmartThings will
list both sensors in a permission granting UI. At that point,
the user will decide whether to give the application access to
the motion sensors or not.
SmartThings supports the functional grouping model—
functionally similar device operations are grouped into a
single capability. Third-party apps gain access at the level of
such functionally-grouped capabilities. Depending on the app’s
functionality, this model can potentially lead to automatic
overprivilege [9]. Fernandes et al. empirically evaluate the
consequences of such overprivilege in their recent security
analysis of SmartThings [9].
B. Threat Model
We assume that SmartApps can be malicious or can be
compromised. Fernandes et al., in their recent security analysis
of the SmartThings platform, demonstrated attacks of both
types [9]. The attacks depend on two factors: (a) users accept
permission requests without realizing the risk an app poses;
(b) apps can ask for more permissions than they need, or
they automatically obtain more permissions than they need
due to the design of the platform and the granularity of
permissions. Under this assumption of overprivileged apps,
our goal is to reduce the risk such apps pose to users. We
1Groovy compiles to Java bytecode
2Although SmartThings uses the word “capabilities,” they are in fact
permissions and are not related to capability-based security. We will use
“permission” in the rest of the paper.
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Fig. 1. Samsung SmartThings Architecture.
consider other types of attacks to be outside the scope of this
work. For example, a compromise of the platform itself will
render permissions themselves useless. Orthogonal techniques
are applicable to secure other parts of the smart home platform.
III. TYCHE: THE RISK-BASED PERMISSION MODEL
Our key insight is that the risk asymmetry between
functionally-related operations in smart homes creates an
imbalance between the level of access to a device that an app
needs, and the level of access provided to it by a traditional
functionally-grouped access control system. Permission group-
ing is vital from a usability standpoint. In theory, we could
require that the application request access for each operation of
a device. However, this extremely fine-grained system creates a
poor user experience, and it ultimately results in users making
poor security decisions due to fatigue [8]. We need to group
operations together, but in the context of the smart home, this
grouping can increase the risks users face.
Tyche avoids this risk by assigning risk levels to each of a
device’s operations, and then groups operations of the device
that have the same risk level into a group. An app can request
access to a device’s operations by specifying a risk level. The
result is that we now have a way of communicating the risk
of an app to the user, and we have a way of limiting the risk
a compromised or malicious app poses to a user.
There are three design challenges that we need to overcome
to design a risk-based permission model: First, how many risk
levels should exist? In the simplest case, we could assign a
risk level to each device operation. However, this can lead to
the same decision fatigue that plagues extremely fine-grained
access control systems. We believe that the answer to this
question depends on the specific smart home platform, and
the specific types of devices it supports. In the context of
SmartThings, we experimented with three levels of risk (low,
medium, high), and found it to be effective. §IV contains an
evaluation showing that with three levels of risk, existing apps
can still function, but now with 60% less access to high risk
operations. Furthermore, as SmartThings supports more than a
100 types of devices covering a wide range, we envision that
the results here are applicable to other platforms that work
with similar devices.
Second, how do we create equivalence classes of device op-
erations, grouped by risk level? We envision such breakdown
of risk to be done by smart home platform developers. To
implement risk-based access control in current SmartThings
platform, however, we asked three researchers with expertise
in security of Internet of Things platforms to systematically
evaluate every function currently available and put them in
three risk categories. We averaged experts evaluations and use
them as gold standard to group operations based on their risk.
Third, how can we implement the risk levels on the Smart-
Things platform to concretely demonstrate their value? It
is a closed-source system, and developers of SmartDevices
(i.e., device handlers) cannot define new capabilities. The
straightforward way of implementing a risk-based system is
to define new capabilities based on risk levels. However, this
is not possible with SmartThings. To overcome this challenge,
we adopt the approach used in ContexIoT [11]. We propose
automatically injecting security code into the apps at the
source code level so that they communicate their risk level
to users when they are installed. The remainder of the section
details this process. It discusses our techniques by assuming a
certain splitting of device operations. §IV contains details on
the exact splitting of SmartThings permissions into risk-based
permissions. Our goal here is to discuss the methodology
of enforcing risk-based permissions on SmartThings apps
independently of a specific splitting of device operations. We
stress that a risk-based permission model can be enforced
in multiple ways. If a smart home platform were to allow
customization (e.g., analogous to Android OS modifications
in smartphone research), then the platform itself could be
modified to support risk-based permissions.
A. Developing a Risk-Based Permission Model
As discussed in §II, each SmartDevice in SmartThings can
expose multiple capabilities (or permissions) depending on the
kinds of operations the device supports. For example, a door
lock will support operations related to battery management,
lock control, and lock code programming. For each of these
functional categories, there are associated permissions. Tyche
retains this model, but introduces a modifier that app devel-
opers need to use while requesting access to a device.
Example. Consider a battery management app that requests
access to battery-backed devices around the home. Currently,
such an app would make a permission request using the
following line of Groovy code:
input ′′battery device′′, ′′capability.battery′′
If the user accepts the permission request, the app will
gain access to all operations that are functionally grouped
together inside capability.battery. As per our discussions,
these operations may differ from a risk perspective. Under
Tyche, this app would instead specify a risk level as follows:
lowRiskRequest
input ′′battery device′′, ′′capability.battery′′
The first line is a method call that signifies that the next line
of code is a permission request for low risk access to devices
that support capability.battery. If a user accepts the eventual
permission prompt, the app will gain access to all low risk
operations defined by capability.battery. Thus, Tyche keeps
code changes to a minimum to help app developers move to
a risk-based permission system. We envision that smart home
platform developers could adopt a similar technique of using
a single modifier for requesting risk-based access.
B. Enforcing a Risk-Based Permissions Model
As the SmartThings platform is closed-source, Tyche uti-
lizes an app rewriting approach for enforcing our risk-based
permission model. This is a common approach to enforcing
security primitives in SmartThings. Notably, the platform itself
performs rewriting to create a sandbox around apps (by allow-
ing and denying certain operations) [9]. Furthermore, recent
work on enforcing contextual security policies on SmartThings
uses the same approach [11]. Rewriting occurs at the source-
code level by operating on the Abstract Syntax Tree (AST)
of the program. Groovy supports compiler extensions that
perform rewriting of the AST. Our high-level approach is to:
(1) Introduce a development-time annotation that the developer
uses to specify the risk level of the access being requested;
(2) a runtime reference monitor that the compiler injects into
the app. This reference monitor hooks all device operation
invocations, and verifies that the operation being invoked
belongs to the risk level that was requested earlier. Figure 2
shows an architectural overview.
As input, the compiler extension takes app source code
where the developer has annotated all permission requests
with the risk rating. We envision this to be achievable with
minimum developer effort as each permission is only requested
once in each application. If there is a permission request
without an annotation, the extension will throw a compila-
tion error, guiding the developer to correctly annotate the
permission request. The extension also takes in a risk table,
that is simply a mapping of SmartThings capability names,
operations (commands or attributes), and the risk rating. As
we discuss in the next section, we use a user study to compute
the risk rating. The extension then performs two steps: (1) it
instruments all method invocations on objects that represent
physical devices to first consult a reference monitor; (2) it
injects a reference monitor into the app that is executed on
every method invocation. Its job is to consult the risk table
and determine if a particular invocation matches the previously
requested risk rating. In our example, if the app attempted a
high risk operation, the reference monitor would deny that
because the developer had only requested low risk access.
To communicate the risk level of an app, our extension also
injects startup code into the app. This results in a notification
to the user of the risk levels that the app requested. The
TABLE I
RISK-BASED PERMISSION EXAMPLES. COMMANDS ARE SHOWN AS
cmd() WHILE ATTRIBUTES ARE PRESENTED AS attr.
Permissions Low-
Risk
Medium-Risk High-Risk
lock – lock() unlock(), lock
alarm – strobe(), siren(),
alarm
–
switch switch – on(), off()
notification is shown on the corresponding smartphone app
of SmartThings.
IV. USABILITY ANALYSIS
We evaluate Tyche from two aspects: First, to understand
the usability of Tyche, we evaluate user perception of risk
in comparison with risk assigned by the domain experts by
conducting a 2 stage user study using 210 participants. Second,
we evaluate three applications under the Tyche model. Our
results show that Tyche limits access to 60% most high-
risk operations, while neither decreasing the functionality, nor
increasing user decision overhead.
A. User Study Setup
To understand user perception of risk associated with phys-
ical device operations, we surveyed 400 Mechanical Turkers.3
The survey started out by collecting basic demographic infor-
mation. Per our IRB, we were not allowed to collect any user-
identifiable data. The demographic information we collected
are as follows: (1) Participant’s age, (2) Number of people in
their household, (3) The home platform they use, and (4) In
cases where the participant’s use SmartThings platform, the
number of applications they have installed.
Next, the survey presented a description of the main task:
Imagine you have several apps installed in your
home automation system. These programs require
certain permissions and can perform actions on your
behalf. Based on each action, indicate your level of
concern based on the following Likert scale:
1) Not Concerned - Select this for actions which
pose little to no risk to you or the people living
with you.
2) Mildly Concerned - Select this for actions which
pose a low risk to you or the people living with
you, but are useful when used as intended.
3) Concerned - Select this for actions which pose a
medium risk to you or the people living with you,
but are useful when used as intended.
4) Very Concerned - Select this for actions which
pose a high risk to you or the people living with
you, but are useful when used as intended.
3We received exemption from our institution’s IRB under title 45 CFR
46.101.(b). Survey data was collected anonymously and did not include any
user-identifiable or sensitive information about the participants.
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Fig. 3. Cumulative distribution of risk for the 146 SmartThings functions
assigned by domain experts. The distribution is divided to three ranges using
K-mean clustering and is used as a basis for our risk-based permission model.
5) Would Not Allow - Select this for actions which
pose a high risk to you or the people living with
you and are better left disabled.
We provided participants with a subset of device operations
and asked them to rate their concern based on the above 5-
point scale. We varied the information associated with the list
of device operations based on the type of study condition. We
had the following conditions:
• Uninformed User Ranking: We recruited 200 users
through Amazon Mechanical Turk to assess the risk
of operations based on an operational description only
(Table II). To reduce decision fatigue, each user was
provided with half of the device operations. In total, we
obtained 100 ratings per function from these users.
• Informed User Ranking: Similar to uninformed user
study, we recruited 200 users through Mechanical Turk.
In addition to an operational description, we provided
each user with a misuse scenario (Table II) to illustrate
the potential risk associated with the device operation.
Similar to the previous condition, we divided operations
into two groups to reduce decision fatigue and collected
100 ratings per device operation.
As a baseline for our study, We used the domain expert
evaluation of all operations from Section III. We consider this
data as the gold standard for our system and compare other
conditions to it.
Dealing with Random Clickers: Although prior studies have
shown that results collected through crowdsourcing ap-
proaches are comparable to lab studies [12], our study is
still susceptible to random clickers who answer the questions
randomly to get the monetary benefit with minimum effort.
To minimize this risk, we used our demographic questions as
indicator questions to remove random responders (e.g., family
size = -2) and the Pearson’s χ2 test to weed out random
clickers as suggested by prior work [12]. These filters left
us with total of 116 and 94 data points for our uninformed
and informed condition, respectively.
B. User Study Results
The age distribution of our participants is presented in
table III. The population of our study consists of mostly
young adults. We discuss how the age might affect user
perception of risk in Section V-B. Table IV also presents the
number of apps SmartThings users install in their platform.
Our results show that most smart home users stick to very
few specific applications. To assess the risk of each operation,
each participant provides a Likert scale response (ranging from
1-5) as the risk of each operation. We average the score given
by each group of our participants (uninformed, informed, and
expert) and use K-means clustering (K=3) to divide these
operations into three groups based on their risk. Table V
provides an overview of the K-means clustering result and the
number of operations falling into the low-, medium-, and high-
risk groups. When users consider the risk of an operation, they
assign conservative risk values compared to domain experts.
Informing the user about the actual misuse scenario lowers the
perceived risk of some of the operations, but does not make
the user complacent when compared to the expert.
To examine the correlation between the risk assessment of
experts (our gold standard) and users, we calculate the Pearson
product-moment correlation coefficient (Pearson’s r) between
the experts and both uninformed and informed users results.
Our results show moderate correlation (0.6) between experts
and uninformed users and strong correlation (0.75) between
the experts and informed users. These results motivate that a
risk-based permission system can push users to make better
risk assessments of access control requests from apps.
C. Case-Studies: Converting Apps to the Risk-Based Model
We first compute the set of device operations accessible to
three existing SmartApps based on the current SmartThings
TABLE II
EXAMPLES OF THE OPERATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH A PERMISSION, THEIR DESCRIPTION, AND THEIR POTENTIAL MISUSE SCENARIO.
Permission Operation Operational Description Misuse Scenario
Switch switch Track the status of the switch Publicly share when switch is turned on/off
Switch on() Turn on connected devices Turn on a device, such a space heater, for a longtime, possibly causing a fire
Lock lock Track the status of the lock Publicly share when your door is unlocked
Lock unlock() Unlock door lock Automatically unlock doors without your knowl-edge
Lock lock() Lock door lock Automatically lock doors without your knowl-edge
TABLE III
AGE DISTRIBUTION OF USER STUDY PARTICIPANTS.
Age 18− 25 25− 35 35+
% of Participants 24% 40% 26%
TABLE IV
NUMBER OF APPS USED BY SMARTTHINGS USERS.
# of Apps < 5 5− 10 > 10
% of SmartThings Users 48% 43% 9%
TABLE V
# OF OPERATIONS THAT FALL INTO EACH RISK CATEGORY & THE RISK
RANGE BASED ON THE K-MEAN CLUSTERING. MAKING USERS CONSIDER
THE RISK OF AN OPERATION MAKES THEM MORE CONSERVATIVE THAN
DOMAIN EXPERTS REGARDING SAFETY OF AN OPERATION.
Risk Low Medium High
Uninformed User 19 45 82(1-1.91) (1.92-2.42) (2.43-5)
Informed User 20 57 69(1-1.94) (1.95-2.59) (2.6-5)
Domain Expert 62 58 26(1-1.83) (1.84-2.83) (2.84-5)
functional-grouping permission model, and then compare that
set of accessible operations to a set we obtain after converting
the apps to use our risk-based model. In general, we observe
that Tyche decreases applications access to risky operations
by 60% across all applications. Table VI shows the result of
the conversion for our three case-studies.
LockDown locks doors after a specified time of day. To
perform its functionality, this application only needs access
to “lock()” function. The current permission model, however,
gives it access to the “unlock()” function as well. If this
application is compromised, an attacker can arbitrarily unlock
the doors to the home. Under our risk-based model, the
application only asks for low-risk access to the lock, that only
grants the “lock()” operation to the app.
SmokeProtector application sounds a siren if the smoke
sensor is triggered. Under the current permission model, this
application can access the “off()” operation. If compromised,
an attacker can turn off the siren. Under our risk-based
model, the application only asks for medium-risk access to
the speaker. This results in only the “siren()” operation being
accessible to the app.
EnergySaver automatically turns off devices around the home
if energy consumption is above a predefined value. Under the
current model, this application can access the “on()” function
of the switches. If compromised, it can turn on switches
arbitrarily, thus powering any connected devices. This can
negate the purpose of the application or, more dangerously,
lead to a fire hazard by powering a device for an extended
time, such as a space heater. Under our risk-based model,
the “off()” and “on()” operations belong to the same high-
risk group. Our users consider “off()” to be high-risk because
it can disable safety-critical functions such as life support
and refrigeration. Although our model does not separate the
“off()” and “on()” operations, at least users are informed of
the risks associated with using the appplication. We count
the number of high-risk operations that apps can access in
the current SmartThings permission model vs. the risk-based
model. We find that on average, apps can remain functional
and have access to 60% less high-risk operations. Therefore, if
an application is compromised, our risk-based model reduces
user risk compared to the current permission model.
V. DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS
A. Tyche vs. “Permission on first use”
Smartphone platforms generally use either an application
install-time permission request modality, or a first-use permis-
sion request modality. We surveyed four smart home platforms
(SmartThings, AllJoyn, IoTvity, HomeKit), and observed that
they currently use install-time permission requests. A potential
reason for not including the first-use modality is that it assumes
the presence of an interface to the user at all times. Smart
home platforms in general might not have traditional user
interfaces. For example, Samsung SmartThings only has a hub
with no display. In this case, the platform uses an external
graphical device, such as a smartphone, to surface the install-
time permission request. However, such a device may not
always be present at the time of a request. This works well
for an install-time modality because the user installs apps with
the help of a companion smartphone app. In the case of first-
use permission requests, the smartphone may not be present
when an application actually accesses a sensitive operation.
Tyche permissions can be used with either request modality,
however, our prototype currently uses an install-time request.
TABLE VI
WE CONVERTED THREE EXISTING SMARTAPPS TO OUR RISK-BASED PERMISSION MODEL. WE FIND THAT ONLY THE ENERGYSAVER APPLICATION
NEEDS HIGH-RISK ACCESS TO A SWITCH. THE OTHER APPS WORK WITHOUT ANY HIGH-RISK ACCESS.
Functional-Grouping Model Risk-Based Model
App Permissions Accessible
Operations
Permissions Accessible
Operations
Lockdown lock,
contactSensor
attrs: lock,
contact.
cmds: lock(),
unlock()
lock.medRisk,
contactSensor.lowRisk
attrs: contact.
cmds: lock()
SmokeProtector alarm,
smokeDetector
attrs: alarm,
smoke.
cmds: off(),
strobe(),
both(),
siren()
alarm.medRisk,
smokeDetector.medRisk
attrs: alarm,
smoke.
cmds: strobe(),
siren(),
both()
EnergySaver powerMeter,
switch
attrs: power,
switch.
cmds: on(),
off()
powerMeter.medRisk,
switch.highRisk
attrs: power,
switch.
cmds: on(),
off()
B. Perception of Risk
A concern with using a risk-based access control system
is that different people may have different perceptions of
acceptable levels of risk. Although getting locked out may
not be a major issue for an adult, it may be problematic
for an elderly (or very young) person. Our user study for
the prototype was conducted using adults only. Therefore, a
limitation is that the resulting risk levels can potentially be
biased towards adult perceptions of risk. An interesting future
work direction is to examine risk perceptions of different age
groups. However, Tyche still provides benefits as it does not
make applications more risky than they already are, and it still
provides some notion of risk, even if the user’s perceptions
may not exactly match the system’s risk levels.
C. Overprivilege in Tyche
Tyche does not completely eliminate overprivilege but
grants applications a risk-based access privilege to each re-
source. This approach is intuitive—if a user trusts an ap-
plication with high-risk functionality, they are fine allowing
less sensitive functions as well. We observe that assigning
risk levels to sensitive operations may or may not change the
granularity of the associated permission’s operations. This is
in part due to our automated clustering process, and in part
due to the need to avoid creating many risk levels (e.g., A
system with ten or fifteen different risk levels will most likely
overwhelm the user and negate any benefits). For some apps
(e.g., EnergySaver in §IV-C), this might not result in the app
gaining even more limited access to sensitive operations—by a
strict definition of overprivilege, even with a risk-based system
like Tyche, the app will still be overprivileged. Even in such
cases, there are benefits to using Tyche—it serves as a means
to notify the user of the riskiness of a particular app.
D. Surfacing Risk Levels to Users
Our user study demonstrates the intuitiveness of a risk-based
permission model. Yet, how best to present these risks to the
user during installation time remains a challenge. Previous
work has looked extensively at this problem in the context of
smartphones [7], [8]. Our initial design in Tyche used color
coding and a second confirmation for high-risk permissions.
We also limited the number of risk levels to three. We leave
a user study on the effectiveness of various user interfaces
and optimal number of levels as future work. An interesting
challenge in surfacing permission requests to users in the
context of smart homes concerns the interface mechanism.
Hub-based platforms like SmartThings use a secondary device
such as a smartphone for surfacing permission requests. Other
platforms, such as voice-based assistants like Amazon Alexa
or Google Home open up the possibility of a voice-based
permission prompt and response mechanism. With a risk-based
system, a challenge is to determine how best to leverage these
newer modalities to communicate the risk level of an app to
the user.
VI. RELATED WORK
Internet of Things platform security is an emerging re-
search area. Fernandes et al. [9] performed a security anal-
ysis of SmartThings. They showed that more than 55% of
SmartThings apps are overprivileged and built four attacks
that exploited the overprivilege. Various systems have since
studied security issues in IoT platforms. FlowFence [10], [14]
proposes data flow protection in IoT frameworks through the
use of sandboxes and taint-tracking to impose flow control be-
tween data sources and sinks, and is concerned with ensuring
that data is not misused. In contrast, risk-based permissions
aim to limit the damage a malicious app can cause. ContexIoT
is a system that collects contextual information that it uses to
help users make more informed decisions when granting per-
missions to apps [11]. The contextual information is extracted
using program analyses techniques. Such contextual prompting
can further help in communicating Tyche risk ratings to users.
Similarly, Roesner et al. introduce Access Control Gadgets
(ACGs) and its implementation on Android, LayerCake [16],
to improve contextual integrity. Our risk ratings can be made
more contexual by adopting ideas from ACGs or from Con-
texIoT depending on the interface modality that is available to
the smart home platform (e.g., classic display, or voice-based
interfaces). However, our goal in this work is to introduce
a system design that is aware of risk asymmetries. Similar to
ContexIoT, our work adopts a rewriting mechanism to enforce
security decisions.
Current smart home platform permissions are modeled after
smartphone permissions. There is a large body of work on
analyzing and improving smartphone permissions [3]. For
instance, Rahmati et al. proposed using application context
to guide access control decisions [15]. While many of these
approaches can be adapted for smart homes, they still over-
privilege apps with high-risk operations because they do not
take into account risk-asymmetry.
Our user study methodology was inspired by Felt et al. [7].
While Felt’s study focused on improving the warning mes-
sages in smartphone application installation UI, our study
focuses on determining the risk level of operations, in order
to define various access control levels in each device. Felt et
al. [8] also performed two user studies on the Android permis-
sion model. They found that that only 17% of participants paid
attention to permissions during installation and only 3% could
answer three permission comprehension questions correctly.
These results motivate development of risk-based permission
models, where users’ understanding of risk factors closely
matches domain experts.
More generally, our work draws on results from risk-aware
access control systems [5], [13], [6]. Adopting terminology
from Petracca et al., we are concerned with three type of risks:
(1) risk due to authorizing unsafe operations; (2) risk due to
abuse of authorized permissions; (3) risk due to granularity
of authorization hooks. Our insight is that current permission
models in smart homes do not adequately communicate risk,
resulting in users possibly authorizing unsafe operations sim-
ply because they do not know the risks involved. The second
type of risk occurs due to the modern app model—apps can
be malicious, or they can be compromised. The third type of
risk occurs due to functional grouping of permissions. Tyche
tackles the first and third types of risk creating risk-similar
groups of operations, and the communicating those risks to
the user. We also introduce a human subjects methodology to
estimate risk. However, Tyche limits the effects of the second
type of risk, instead of removing it altogether.
Tyche currently uses static estimates of risk. However, risk
can change depending on the user. We envision that results
from fuzzy MLS systems could be applicable in encoding
dynamic risk perceptions into a risk-based access control
system [6] for smart homes. We leave this to future work.
VII. CONCLUSION
Smart home platforms currently use permission models
inspired by smartphone OSes. These permission models group
device operations based on functionality, and do not take
risk-asymmetry into account. Although grouping operations
together makes it easier for developers and users to work
with permissions, it also overprilvileges apps. Due to the risk-
asymmetry, overprivilege can drastically increase the potential
for damage if apps are malicious or exploitable. Therefore,
we introduced risk-based permissions as an alternative way
to group device permissions. We designed Tyche using app
rewriting techniques to enforce risk-based permissions, and we
conducted a study involving domain experts and Mechanical
Turkers to compute user-perceived risk. Our study finds that
experts and users share a similar perception of risk. Based on
these findings, we re-grouped a physical device’s operations
into three groups—low-, medium-, and high-risk. We con-
structed such groupings for 146 operations across 61 types of
devices. We evaluated our risk-based model on three existing
SmartApps. We found that these apps can be written in a way
that reduces access to high-risk operations by 60%.
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